Evolution of cooperation has been one of the most important problems in sociobiology, and many researchers have revealed mechanisms that can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. However, most studies deal only with one cooperative behaviour, even though some organisms perform two or more cooperative behaviours. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum performs two cooperative behaviours in starvation: fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Here, we constructed a model that couples these two behaviours, and we found that the two behaviours are maintained because of the emergence of cyclic dominance, although cooperation cannot evolve if only either of the two behaviours is performed. The common chemoattractant cyclic adenosine 3 0 ,5 0 -monophosphate (cAMP) is used in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, providing a biological context for this coupling. Cyclic dominance emerges regardless of the existence of mating types or spatial structure in the model. In addition, cooperation can re-emerge in the population even after it goes extinct. These results indicate that the two cooperative behaviours of the social amoeba are maintained because of the common chemical signal that underlies both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. We demonstrate the importance of coupling multiple games when the underlying behaviours are associated with one another.
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Evolution of cooperation has been one of the most important problems in sociobiology, and many researchers have revealed mechanisms that can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. However, most studies deal only with one cooperative behaviour, even though some organisms perform two or more cooperative behaviours. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum performs two cooperative behaviours in starvation: fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Here, we constructed a model that couples these two behaviours, and we found that the two behaviours are maintained because of the emergence of cyclic dominance, although cooperation cannot evolve if only either of the two behaviours is performed. The common chemoattractant cyclic adenosine 3 0 ,5 0 -monophosphate (cAMP) is used in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, providing a biological context for this coupling. Cyclic dominance emerges regardless of the existence of mating types or spatial structure in the model. In addition, cooperation can re-emerge in the population even after it goes extinct. These results indicate that the two cooperative behaviours of the social amoeba are maintained because of the common chemical signal that underlies both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. We demonstrate the importance of coupling multiple games when the underlying behaviours are associated with one another.
Introduction
Evolution of cooperation has been a challenging topic in sociobiology. Although it is a widespread behaviour, apparent from human societies [1] to microbial communities [2] , cooperation is vulnerable to invasion by defectors. Cooperators pay a cost for helping other individuals, while defectors pay no cost but receive the benefits from cooperators. As a consequence, natural selection should favour defectors [3, 4] . However, many studies have revealed mechanisms that facilitate the evolution of cooperation, including kin discrimination [5] [6] [7] , spatial structure that enables cooperators to interact frequently with one another [8] [9] [10] [11] and a by-product which increases the benefit for cooperators (e.g. pleiotropy [12] [13] [14] [15] ).
Most studies have explored only one cooperative behaviour at a time. However, some organisms, such as the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, perform multiple types of cooperation. It has been known that D. discoideum performs two distinct types of cooperative behaviours in starvation. One of these is fruiting body formation, wherein some cells differentiate into spore cells and survive, while other cells differentiate into non-viable stalk cells and aid in the dispersal of spore cells [16] . The offspring germinate from spore cells after conditions become favourable [17] . The other cooperative behaviour is known as macrocyst formation, wherein some cells become sexually mature and produce offspring after forming diploid zygote cells, but other cells remain vegetative and provide energy to the zygote cells through cannibalism [18] . The haploid progeny eventually appears, but the germination process remains unclear [18] .
In fruiting body formation, cells first aggregate by responding to synchronously secreted cAMP [19] , and then the aggregated cells form multicellular slugs and develop into fruiting bodies. When cells from two or more strains form a fruiting body (i.e. forming a chimeric fruiting body), the cell-type ratio has a large effect on the fitness of each strain [20, 21] . If cells from one strain differentiate only into spore cells, this strain can receive a large benefit through the formation of chimeric fruiting bodies because they pay no cost for stalk formation. As differentiation is a key to fruiting body formation, theoretical studies have focused on signalling chemicals that induce stalk formation [22, 23] .
In macrocyst formation, about 16% of cells first mature sexually and differentiate into gametes or fusion component (FC) cells [24] , whereas other cells remain vegetative. In the heterothallic strains of D. discoideum, there are three mating types, and each FC cell fuses with that of a different mating type [25] . After cell fusion, pronuclear fusion occurs [26] and zygote cells are formed. The zygote cells then secrete cAMP [27] to collect the vegetative cells around them for cannibalization, which leads to mature zygote cells in the macrocysts. Macrocyst formation can be considered as a form of cooperation because (i) the division of labours between FC cells ( producing offspring thorough macrocyst formation) and vegetative cells (offering energy thorough cannibalization) is similar to the relationship between spore cells and stalk cells in fruiting body formation, and (ii) the vegetative cells can avoid the cannibalism and survive if they ignore cAMP from the macrocyst (i.e. a strain behaves as a defector in macrocyst formation). In contrast with the studies on fruiting body formation, however, there are fewer studies on the evolution of macrocyst formation, probably because of difficulties in germinating macrocysts in the laboratory [28] . To our knowledge, there are only two theoretical studies on macrocyst formation: one shows that fluctuations in food availability play an important role in maintaining the ability to aggregate the vegetative cells [29] , and the other indicates that without food fluctuation, vegetative cells would still respond to cAMP if macrocyst formation co-occurs with fruiting body formation and if cooperation in fruiting body formation is preserved [30] .
Here, we use a modelling approach to demonstrate that the two cooperative behaviours of D. discoideum, fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, can be maintained by coupling the evolution of these two behaviours. First, we considered a very simple situation that ignored mating types and spatial structure. In this model, cyclic dominance, a loop structure where one strategy beats another strategy, but this strategy is beaten by still another strategy, emerged under some conditions (see inequality (2.7) and figure 2), and cooperation in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation was maintained. We then introduced variation in mating types and assumed that macrocyst formation occurred only between different mating types. Cyclic dominance again emerged in this case. When the model included spatial structure, such that each colony of the social amoeba interacted only with their neighbours, this result held and cooperation was maintained. Thus, by coupling these cooperative behaviours, cyclic dominance emerges and both behaviours are maintained even if it is assumed that neither cooperative behaviour can evolve alone. These results are consistent regardless of mating types and spatial structure introduced to the model if the environment where fruiting body formation co-occurs with macrocysts is assumed.
Models
In this section, we describe the methods for the simulations we performed. The materials and methods for the experiments conducted in this study can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
(a) Model assumptions
As both fruiting bodies and macrocysts are formed under dark and dry conditions [30] (see also our experimental results in electronic supplementary material, figure S9 ), we assume that D. discoideum can perform both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Note that we ignore homologous recombination during macrocyst formation. For simplicity, the games of fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation are assumed to be based on a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game where the defector is the evolutionary stable strategy [31] . Although the PD game cannot be adequate for conceptualizing either fruiting body formation or macrocyst formation and cooperation can evolve in each game without coupling them in nature (for example, e i may be smaller than 0 in equation (2.1)), we assume the most difficult conditions for cooperators to evolve in each game.
However, one can consider a third strategy called a loner or a solitary in fruiting body formation. Such a strategy does not respond to cAMP and never participates in fruiting body formation, receiving a constant benefit regardless of the strategies of the partners. In other words, the game of the fruiting body formation is what the third strategy is added to a PD game. The pay-off matrices of fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation are, therefore, given by where h denotes the effect of forming small fruiting bodies (0 , h 1) due to the absence of the partner in fruiting body formation, and e 0 is the pay-off for remaining as solitary vegetative cells in fruiting body formation (figure 1). It should be noted that the inequality b i . a i ) e i . 0 is satisfied for i ¼ 1, 2, because the two games are based on PD games. We assume that starvation continues for a long period, where almost all vegetative cells die [32] . In this case, it is reasonable to assume that e 0 ( min {e 1 , e 2 }. Considering these conditions, cooperation cannot evolve and the defectors are evolutionarily stable strategies if only either of the two games is performed. Therefore, one can call the game of fruiting body formation an extended PD game, while the game of macrocyst formation is an ordinary PD game. Cooperators of fruiting body formation are defined as those that produce both spore cells and stalk cells, whereas defectors produce only spore cells. When cooperators form fruiting bodies with another cooperator, they receive benefit a 1 . On the other hand, defectors receive b 1 when they exploit the cooperators by forming chimeric fruiting bodies, but the cooperator receives no benefit in this case. However, when defectors interact with another defector, they receive only a small benefit e 1 because they are both deficient in stalk formation. Such a ð2:1Þ rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 285: 20180905 mutant strain is referred to as fbxA 2 in D. discoideum [33] . The loners of fruiting body formation always receive the pay-off e 0 as they cannot join in fruiting body formation, whereas the cooperators and defectors receive ha 1 and he 1 , respectively, when they interact with the loners. These decreases in the pay-offs of the cooperators and the defectors reflect the situation where they form the smaller fruiting bodies which provide lower pay-offs due to the inefficiency of dispersal. In macrocyst formation, cooperators provide energy to zygote cells by making vegetative cells respond to cAMP to allow cannibalization by zygote cells. On the other hand, defectors avoid cannibalistic attack by ignoring cAMP. Such a mutant strain is known as TMC1 [34] . When the two cooperators produce macrocysts together, they each receive a benefit a 2 , as macrocysts obtain enough energy through cannibalism. On the other hand, if a defector interacts with a cooperator, the defector receives b 2 by avoiding a cannibalistic attack, but the cooperator receives no benefit. However, when the two defectors form macrocysts together, they receive a very small benefit e 2 , as macrocysts cannot receive enough energy from the vegetative cells alone.
It should be noted that the common chemical signal cAMP plays an important role in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation; aggregation requires cAMP in both cases. If cells do not aggregate in macrocyst formation (i.e. a defector of macrocyst formation), they do not aggregate in fruiting body formation either (i.e. a loner of fruiting body formation) [34] . In other words, defectors during macrocyst formation behave as the loners in fruiting body formation.
We began by building a very simple model, where mating types and spatial structure were ignored. In this case, there were only three strategies: a cooperator of both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation (C), a defector of fruiting body formation that behaved as a cooperator of macrocyst formation (D F ) and a defector of macrocyst formation that could not join in fruiting body formation (D M ). Coupling the pay-off matrices of the two games in equation (2.1), the pay-off matrix A is given by
ð2:2Þ
where u is the probability that macrocyst formation occurs (0 u 1), while 1 2 u refers to fruiting body formation ( figure 1) .
Next, we introduced mating types (type 1 and type 2). In this model, there exist six strategies (C 1 
, where the subscripts indicate the mating types of each strategy (e.g. C 1 represents a cooperator with mating type 1). Within the mating types, only fruiting body formation is performed, whereas both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation are performed between the mating types. Note that u represents the probability that macrocyst formation is performed between the mating types. In the model including mating types, therefore, the pay-off matrix S is described as
where A(0) is a 3 Â 3 pay-off matrix for the same mating type strategies (they perform only fruiting body formation), while A(u) refers to the pay-off matrix for different mating type players that perform macrocyst formation with the probability of u.
It should be noted that we ignore the failure of macrocyst formation: i.e. producing FC cells when interacting with the same mating type strains. This assumption will not change the main results in this paper because even if a strain produces FC cell in error, the strain can obtain the benefit from fruiting body formation. In macrocyst formation, some cells differentiate into FC cells, while the other cells remain vegetative cells. Such vegetative cells should be able to perform fruiting body formation. Therefore, the strain can receive the benefit from fruiting body formation in the case of failure in macrocyst formation, although the benefits should be smaller than a 1 because of the cost of producing FC cells, which will die at the end. This cost should be small because the ratio of FC cells is about 16% [24] . Therefore, the failure of macrocyst formation will not change our main results below.
(b) Replicator dynamics
The continuous and discrete replicator dynamics are defined, respectively:
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where x i is the frequency of strategy i, x is a vector of the frequencies of each strategy (x ¼ (x i )) and P is a pay-off matrix. When the mating types are ignored, P equals the pay-off matrix A given by equation (2.2), while P equals the pay-off matrix S by equation (2.3) if mating types are included. Numerical computation for continuous replicator dynamics was conducted in Python using the integrators of 'ode' with 'dopri5' or 'odeint' in the Scipy package [35] .
(c) Agent-based model
One of the advantages of using an agent-based model is to introduce spatial structure. As macrocyst formation occurs only between mating types, spatial structure can have an effect on the frequencies of fruiting body formation and zygote small fruiting body solitary vegetative cells Figure 1 . Illustrations of the parameters u, e 0 and h. When the two strategies interact, they form macrocyst formation with a probability of u or fruiting body formation with a probability of
colonies in the neighbourhood had the same mating type. In addition, the spatial structure would be important for considering the social amoeba in nature, because they perform both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation through aggregation. In other words, the cells interact only with their neighbours. For these two reasons, we analysed the model with the spatial structure.
In the agent-based model, each agent represents a small colony of D. discoideum that has one of the six strategies ( After all agents finish their interaction and their total pay-offs are calculated, they synchronously update their strategies to those of their neighbours with some probabilities given below. In many studies, the Fermi function f(w) ¼ 1={1 þ exp ( À w)} is used as a stochastic update process [36, 37] , but the Fermi function is for the pairwise update process. Therefore, we defined the probability P ij that agent i adopts the strategy of agent j using the softmax function
where p i is the total pay-off of agent i, N i is the set of agents in the neighbourhood of agent i (including agent i itself) and K is the inverse of the intensity of selection. It is more likely that agent i adopts the strategy of agent j in the next time step if p i , p j , but agent i stochastically may adopt the strategy of agent l even if p i . p l . At the K ! 0 limit, agent i adopts only the strategy of the agent whose pay-off is the highest in the neighbourhood. By contrast, as K increases, it is more likely that each agent randomly adopts a strategy in its neighbourhood (selection does not work in the K ! 1 limit). We performed the pairwise invasion analysis at 100 Â 100 lattice points. One of the two strategies is called an invader, whose initial frequency is 0.01, and the other is a resident. We ran the simulation for 1000 time steps at various parameter values, and we replicated the simulation 50 times in each case. We then investigated whether the invaders excluded the residents (the invader frequency was greater than 0.99 at the end of the simulation) or they were maintained (the frequencies were greater than 0.01). If invaders excluded the residents, this indicated that the invaders beat the residents. If the invaders did not exclude the residents but they were maintained, they coexisted with the residents.
We then simulated the situations where all six strategies existed at the initial conditions. In this case, we used 300 Â 300 lattice points to reduce stochastic effects. In each simulation, the initial frequencies of all strategies were equal, and simulations were continued for 100 000 time steps. We replicated the simulation 10 times at each value of u.
We also investigated the effect of mutation in the agentbased model. We again used 300 Â 300 lattice points, but here we assumed that mutation was rare; at each 500 time step, one agent was randomly chosen to update the strategy to one of the other five strategies, which was again randomly chosen. All codes for the agent-based model were written in C language.
Results (a) Excluding mating types and spatial structure
First of all, we built the simple model that does not include mating types or spatial structure. In this case, the pay-off matrix given by equation (2.2) shows a rock -scissorspaper (RSP) game, approximately if In addition, we found that the continuous replicator dynamics [38] has a unique internal equilibrium G, to which any other interior point converges if inequality (2.7) holds (figure 2, see the electronic supplementary material for detail). In this case, a cooperator of both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation C is maintained, although it is not an evolutionarily stable strategy [39] . Therefore, cooperation is maintained if there exist two games, even though cooperation cannot evolve when the social amoeba plays either of them. Other examples of the evolutionary dynamics in this model are shown in electronic supplementary material, figure S1.
It should be noted, however, that the application of continuous replicator dynamics is unlikely to be valid for D. discoideum because fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation occur in discrete generations; fruiting body formation and/or macrocyst formation occur through starvation, with the offspring subsequently emerging. Thus, discrete replicator dynamics should be applied. Mathematically, the continuous Figure 2 . The evolutionary dynamics given by continuous replicator dynamics with the pay-off matrix by equation (2.2) when inequality (2.7) holds. The three orbits (cyan, yellow and magenta) begin at different initial points but converge at the internal equilibrium G. The parameters are a 1 ¼ 1, replicator dynamics is a limited case of discrete replicator dynamics [40] , which means the result shown in figure 2 is not always valid when the discrete replicator dynamics is applied. Indeed, we found that with discrete replicator dynamics the range wherein any orbit converges to the internal point G is narrower than that in the case of continuous replicator dynamics (inequality (2.7), see also electronic supplementary material, figure S2 ).
(b) A model that includes mating types
When the model includes the existence of mating types, cyclic dominance emerges again (figure 3). In this case, fruiting body formation occurs both within and between the mating types, while macrocyst formation occurs only between the mating types. This means that the parameter u is the probability that macrocyst formation occurs between mating types. As shown in figure 3, D Although continuous or discrete replicator dynamics can be applied when mating types are introduced, it is difficult to calculate the stability of an interior equilibrium because of the high dimensionality of the model. In addition, the initial mating type ratio has a large effect on the evolutionary dynamics (electronic supplementary material, figure S3 ). For these reasons, we used an agent-based model for additional analyses.
(c) A model that includes spatial structure
In the agent-based model, we again found cyclic dominance that was similar to figure 3, and this result is confirmed by the results of the pairwise invasion analysis shown in electronic supplementary material, figures S4-S6. We then analysed cases wherein all six strategies coexisted equally in the initial conditions. Owing to the emergence of cyclic dominance, the cooperators (both C 1 and C 2 ) were maintained if u was sufficiently large (figure 4a). When u ¼ 0, only fruiting body formation occurred within and between mating types. As a consequence, defectors of fruiting body formation (D were maintained. This is because the probability of macrocyst formation between mating types u is not sufficiently large for cooperators C i to obtain the benefits from forming macrocysts with the other mating type cooperators C j or defectors of fruiting body formation D F j ( j = i) (electronic supplementary material, figure S4) , and because defectors of macrocyst formation can exploit other mating type defectors of fruiting body formation (electronic supplementary material, figure S6 ). If u is sufficiently large (0.4 u 1), however, the cooperators can beat the other mating type defectors of fruiting body formation (electronic supplementary material, figure S4 ) and all six strategies can be maintained (figure 4b). It should be noted that the model with spatial structure does not show the complex dynamics, in contrast to the model without spatial structure (electronic supplementary material, figure S3 ), although the dynamics in the model with the spatial structure do not converge to the fixed values because of the stochasticity. In the model with spatial structure, cyclic dominance again contributes to the maintenance of cooperation. Although the spatial structure has a positive effect on the evolution of cooperation, we used the parameter values with which Cs go extinct if the same mating type D F s invade (electronic supplementary material, figure S4 ). In addition, the previous study shows that if the game in macrocyst formation is ignored and cyclic dominance disappears, the coexistence of the two mating types of D F is the evolutionarily stable state [41] .
From these two points, cyclic dominance can be considered as contributing to the evolution of cooperation in this model. Next, mutation was introduced into the agent-based model. Under the assumption that mutation occurs in each 500 time step, only a few strategies can coexist. Here, cooperators can re-invade the population even after they are excluded (electronic supplementary material, figure S8 ). In the initial condition, two mating types of cooperators (C 1 and C 2 ) coexist, but these cooperators disappear because of the invasion of the two mating types of D s is an evolutionarily stable state if the game for macrocyst formation is ignored [41] , but this coexistence collapses with the invasion of one mating type defector of macrocyst formation. After that, either of the two mating types of cooperator appears again by mutation and becomes dominant in the population. Thus, cooperators of both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation can be revived even after they disappear.
Discussion
In this paper, our models demonstrate that the two cooperative behaviours of D. discoideum, fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, can be maintained by coupling the two games. While previous research assumed the maintenance of cooperation in fruiting body formation [30] , we show that defectors can appear in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Even though we assume that the defectors are the evolutionarily stable strategies in both of the games in the single game dynamics, the two cooperative behaviours can be maintained if the model includes both of the games simultaneously.
The primary biological explanation for this result is that the two games are not independent; the common chemical signal cAMP is necessary for aggregation in both fruiting body formation (reviewed in [42] ) and macrocyst formation [27] . If some cells do not aggregate (i.e. defect) in macrocyst formation, they receive benefits by avoiding the cannibalistic attack by zygote cells. On the other hand, these cells have substantial costs because they cannot participate in fruiting body formation. Indeed, a mutant that weakly expresses a cAMP receptor will result in poor aggregation for both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation [34] . This phenomenon is represented as e 0 in the pay-off matrix (equation (2.2)), and this provides an explanation why the cooperator of both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation (C ) can beat the defector of macrocyst formation (D M ) in the most simple model, wherein the existence of mating types and spatial structure is ignored ( figure 2 ). The key factor for the maintenance of the cooperators is the emergence of cyclic dominance. Under a simple model without the inclusion of mating types and spatial structure, if the inequality (2.7) is satisfied, the pay-off matrix given by equation (2.2) follows an RSP game, which is a famous example of cyclic dominance [43] . In addition, the continuous replicator dynamics shows the existence of the global attractor in this model (figure 2), and the discrete replicator dynamics shows a similar result (electronic supplementary material, figure S2) . Moreover, even when mating types are introduced, cyclic dominance continues to emerge (figure 3). Within mating types, the defectors of fruiting body formation (D Owing to cyclic dominance, all six strategies can coexist (figure 4), and cooperators can re-emerge even after they are excluded (electronic supplementary material, figure S8 ).
The approach we employed in this paper is referred to as multi-games [37, 44, 45] or mixed games [46] in evolutionary game theory, wherein players play two or more games with different pay-off matrices. Although these terms seem unlikely to be used in other fields, it has been known that microbes have multiple inter-linked games or social traits [47] . For example, the production of many kinds of public good is regulated by the quorum-sensing (QS) system [2] . Not only the production of public good but also the production of QS molecules can be regarded as a game because of the cost of producing QS molecules and the effect of QS molecules other than regulating the production of public good [48] [49] [50] . In other words, both the production of QS molecules and that of public good are games, and the game of QS molecules has an effect on the public good game.
In addition, recent studies have suggested that microorganisms show cyclic dominance due to the existence of two games. Inglis et al. [51] analysed the public good games in Pseudomonas communities, wherein there exist two types of public good (i.e. two public good games) and either of the two types of public good is available to each strain. In such communities, the cooperators or the producers can beat the defectors in the other public good game because the defectors cannot exploit the other type of public good, and therefore cyclic dominance emerges. Another example is shown by Kelsic et al. [52] , where the the production of antibiotics and their degraders are combined. Although the game of antibiotic production alone can show cyclic dominance, it is impossible to lead to the coexistence of all strategies without the spatial structure in the case of antibiotic production alone. On the other hand, the introduction of the game of degrader production maintains the cyclic dominance and all strategies can coexist without the spatial structure. Considering these studies and our results, multi-game dynamics might be natural in microbial communities and a factor of stabilizing cooperation and genetic diversity.
It should be noted that our results are based on the assumption that fruiting bodies and macrocysts coexist. Although this has been shown under dark and relatively dry conditions [30] , macrocysts are not formed under light conditions [53] and fruiting body formation is inhibited in water [54] . Under these conditions, D. discoideum undergoes only one or the other behaviour, and cooperative behaviours are not maintained. In other words, the probability of macrocyst formation rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Proc. R. Soc. B 285: 20180905 u changes over time under changing environments, and cooperation between fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation would be destabilized. Indeed, our model shows that cooperation of fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation is not always maintained under dynamic environments (electronic supplementary material, figure S10). Future research should consider how changing environmental conditions would affect these conclusions.
In addition, our models are a simplification of the complex behaviours exhibited by D. discoideum. For example, we assumed distinct strategies (to cooperate or to defect) for both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, but these strategies are continuous. Productivity and sensitivity to signals for differentiation in fruiting body formation [22, 23] , or the ratio of FC cells and vegetative cells in macrocyst formation [30] , can be considered. In addition, we assumed that starvation continues for an extended period of time. If this assumption was relaxed, our results might change because a lack of aggregating cells can be beneficial for fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation if the resource condition quickly recovers [55] . Under this scenario, it may be possible that defectors of macrocyst formation (D M s) can beat cooperators (Cs), which would lead to the collapse of cyclic dominance.
Moreover, our results do not contradict those of previous studies. For example, kin discrimination by the cell adhesion proteins TgrB1 and TgrC1 [56] and the greenbeard effect encoded by csA [57] are important for maintenance of cooperation in fruiting body formation. If these effects are included in a model, cooperation would be maintained. Our results, on the other hand, suggest that cooperation can be maintained even if such effects do not exist or if they are incomplete. In addition, if kin discrimination and/ or the greenbeard effect are introduced in our models and D F s do not spread, defectors of macrocyst formation (D M s) may be unable to invade and only cooperators (Cs) will be maintained because D M s cannot beat Cs.
Conclusion
In summary, we propose that cooperative behaviours in the social amoeba can be maintained by coupling the two games. This is because cyclic dominance emerges from the common cAMP signal that is necessary for aggregation in both behaviours. This result is consistent when mating types and spatial structure are introduced into the model, suggesting the generality of these findings and the importance of including multi-games in behavioural models, especially if the games are inter-linked. Such multi-game dynamics of inter-linked games seems general in microorganisms.
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